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17 November 2001
Source: http://www.faa.gov/apa/emerad.htm

November 16, 2001

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Aircraft Certification Service

Emergency Airworthiness Directive

Transmitted as follows is emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2001-23-51, for the attention of certain owners and operators of Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R (collectively called A300-600) series airplanes; and Model A310 series airplanes.

Background

On November 12, 2001, an Airbus Model A300 B4-605R airplane was involved in an accident shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York.  The cause of the accident is under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).  Although the NTSB has not determined the cause of the accident, it has determined that the vertical stabilizer departed the airplane.  In addition, the rudder was found separated from the vertical stabilizer. 

The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes with Airbus Modification 4886 is manufactured of advanced composite materials.  The vertical stabilizer on Airbus Model A310 series airplanes with the same modification is manufactured of the same materials.  Failure of the vertical stabilizer-to-fuselage attachment fittings, transverse (side) load fittings, or rudder-to-vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, if not corrected, could result in loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or rudder and consequent loss of control of the airplane.

Images added by Cryptome, from The New York Times.
Top November 16, bottom November 15, 2001.


The FAA considers that, before structural failure, it may be possible to detect indications of possible failure modes that could result in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the airplane.  These indications include edge delaminations, cracked paint, surface distortions, other surface damage, and failure of the transverse (side) load fittings.  Similarly, indications of failure of the rudder assembly, which could lead to failure of the vertical stabilizer, may also be detectable with such an inspection.   Although neither the FAA nor the NTSB have reached conclusions with respect to these possible failures on the accident airplane, we consider it prudent to require an inspection of these structures to identify any such indication that may exist. 

These airplane models are manufactured in France and are type-certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement.  The FAA has coordinated this action with the Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for France, and the DGAC has taken similar action. 


Explanation of the Requirements of the Rule

Since a potential unsafe condition may exist, this AD is issued to require a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect repairs and alterations to, and damage of the vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, including the main attachment lugs and the transverse (side) load fittings; and the rudder hinge fittings, hinge arms, and support fittings for all rudder hinges, and rudder actuator support fittings; and repair, if necessary.  Damage of the metallic areas includes pulled or loose fasteners, wear areas, distorted flanges, cracks, and corrosion.  Damage of the composite areas includes delamination; distorted surfaces that may indicate delamination; cracks in the paint surface; evidence of moisture damage; and cracked, splitting, or frayed fibers.  This AD also requires that operators report results of inspection findings to the FAA.


Interim Action

This is considered to be interim action.  The inspection report that is required by this AD will enable the FAA, DGAC, and manufacturer to obtain better insight into the potential unsafe condition, and eventually to develop final action to address it, if necessary.  If final action is identified, the FAA may consider further rulemaking.

Determination of Rule’s Effective Date

Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for making this AD effective in less than 15 days.

This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 (formerly section 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958) pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this AD.

AD 2001-23-51 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE:  Docket No. 2001-NM-359-AD.

Applicability:   Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R (collectively called A300-600) series airplanes; and Model A310 series airplanes; certificated in any category; having a vertical stabilizer made of composite material (reference Airbus Modification 4886).

Note 1:  This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD.  For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD.  The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the potential unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the potential unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance:   Required as indicated, unless accomplished within the last 6 months.

To prevent failure of the vertical stabilizer-to-fuselage attachment fittings or transverse (side) load fittings, or rudder-to-vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, which could result in loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or rudder and consequent loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following:


Compliance Time

(a)  Within 15 days after the receipt of this AD, do the inspections specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this AD.

Note 2:   For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual inspection is defined as:  “An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity.  Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector.  Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used.  Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.”


Inspection and Corrective Actions

(b)  Perform a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect repairs and alterations to, and damage of the vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, including the main attachment lugs and the transverse (side) load fittings. Any alteration made to the composite structures, either during production or post-production, is considered areas of primary concern.  Gain access to the vertical stabilizer attachment fittings by removing external fairings and internal access covers and inspect both sides of affected attachment fittings.  Damage of the metallic areas includes pulled or loose fasteners, wear areas, distorted flanges, cracks, and corrosion.  Damage of the composite areas includes delamination; distorted surfaces that may indicate delamination; cracks or abrading in the paint surface; surface damage; evidence of moisture damage; and cracked, splitting, or frayed fibers.

(1)  If any damage is found to the vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, including the main attachment lugs and the transverse (side) load fittings, before further flight, repair per a method approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

(2)  If any repair or alteration to the attachment lug areas of the vertical stabilizer has been accomplished previously, before further flight, the repair or alteration must be approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116.

(c)  Perform a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect damage of the rudder hinge fittings, hinge arms, and support fittings for all rudder hinges, and rudder actuator support fittings.  Damage of the metallic areas includes pulled or loose fasteners, wear areas, distorted flanges, cracks, and corrosion.  Damage of the composite areas includes delamination; distorted surfaces that may indicate delamination; cracks or abrading in the paint surface; surface damage; evidence of moisture damage; and cracked, splitting, or frayed fibers.  If any damage is found, before further flight, repair per the manufacturer’s structural repair manual, or per a method approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116.


Report

(d)  Submit a report of inspection findings (both positive and negative) to the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116; fax (425) 227-1149; at the applicable time specified in paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD.  The report must include the inspection results, a description of any repair, alteration, or discrepancy found, including digital photographs of the damaged area, the airplane serial number, and the number of flight cycles and flight hours on the airplane.  Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

(1)  For airplanes on which the inspection is accomplished after receipt of this AD:  Submit the report within 5 days after performing the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD.

(2)  For airplanes on which the inspection has been accomplished prior to receipt of this AD:  Submit the report within 5 days after receipt of this AD.


Alternative Methods of Compliance

(e)  An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116.  Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, which may add comments and then send it to the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116.

Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the International Branch, ANM-116.

Special Flight Permits

(f)   Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Effective Date

(g)  AD 2001-23-51, issued on November 16, 2001, becomes effective upon receipt.

For further information contact:  Henry Offermann, Aerospace Engineer; Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; telephone (425) 227-2676; fax (425) 227-1100.

Issued in Washington, DC, on November 16, 2001.


John J. Hickey,
Director,
Aircraft Certification Service